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Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection et.
al., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
Matt Newman
ABSTRACT
A homeowners association sued the state of Florida to stop a beach restoration project
that would have created seventy-five feet of new beach separating the private homes from the
ocean front. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the homeowners‟ argument that the project was
an unlawful taking because it would end the homeowners‟ ability to receive new sand deposits
from the ocean onto their private beachfront. The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies equally to court orders and decisions of the judicial
branch as it does to actions of the legislative and executive branches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection
et. al. was delivered by the United States Supreme Court in June of 2010.165 With the exception
of Justice Stevens, who did not participate in the decision of this case, a unanimous court held
that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection‟s (FDEP) effort to restore an eroded
beach did not constitute an unconstitutional “taking” of private beachfront property under the
Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. Despite the appearance of unanimity however, the
Court was deeply divided in their reasoning, and the opinion was a complicated mix of pluralities
and partial concurrences.

165

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Protec. et. al., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2613 (2010) (Kennedy
& Breyer, JJ., concurring in part).
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1961, Florida‟s legislature passed the Beach and Shore Preservation Act 166 (Act) to
enable local governments to maintain and repair eroded beachfront.167 The Act requires local
governments, wanting to undertake renourishment projects, to apply to the FDEP to obtain
necessary permits and funding.168 If the project requires laying fill material on state-owned
submerged lands, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board), which
is the government entity holding title to the lands, must approve the project.169 Once a project is
underway, the Board designates an “erosion control line,” set by reference to the mean highwater line on the beach, which is determined by averaging the reach of the high-tide over the
preceding nineteen years.170 This erosion control line distinguishes a private owner‟s beachfront
property from the state‟s trust land.171 Once the erosion control line is set, fill is placed seaward
of the line, creating new beach on previously submerged state land.172
III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2003, Florida‟s city of Destin and Walton County applied to the FDEP for permits to
restore approximately seven miles of beachfront that had been washed out by hurricanes.173 The
project would add seventy-five feet of new beach seaward of the mean high-water line by
applying fill to submerged state trust land.174 The FDEP issued a public notice that it intended to
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Id. at 2599 (citing Fla. Stat. §§ 161.011-161.45 (2007)).
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 2598, 2599.
171
Id. at 2598 (citing Miller v. Bay-To-Gulf, Inc., 141 Fla. 452, 458-460, 193 So. 425, 427-428 (1940)).
172
Id. at 2599.
173
Id. at 2600.
174
Id.
167
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grant the permits, and the Board approved the use of the fill and the creation of the erosion
control line.175
In response, a group of homeowners, whose property bordered the project area, formed a
non-profit corporation named Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (Homeowners) to bring an
administrative challenge to the proposed project.176 After an administrative panel denied the
Homeowners‟ challenge, the case was taken to the Florida District Court of Appeal for the First
District, which held that approval of the project had eliminated the rights of two homeowners to
both receive accretions177 on their property and to have contact between their property and the
water.178
Because the project infringed on these property rights, the district court held that in
issuing the permits the FDEP had performed an unlawful taking of the two homeowners‟ future
accretions.179 After setting aside the approval of the permits, the district court certified to the
Florida Supreme Court the question of whether the Act unconstitutionally deprived upland
property owners of their littoral property rights without just compensation.180 The Florida
Supreme Court held the Act was not unconstitutional and denied the Homeowners‟ request for a
rehearing. The Homeowners then appealed the Florida Supreme Court‟s denial of rehearing to
the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that the Florida Supreme Court‟s decision was

175

Id.
Id.
177
Accretions are additions of sand, sediment, or other deposits to water front lands. Traditionally, for land to
qualify as an accretion, it must have formed as a result of a gradual drying that is so slow that the result only
becomes noticeable after many years. When an accretion is formed it is considered to be part of the littoral property
of the private property owner. Id. at 2598 (citing F. Maloney, S. Plager, & F. Baldwin, Water Law and
Administration: the Florida Experience § 126, pp. 385-386 (1968)).
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Id. at 2600.
179
Id.
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itself an unlawful taking and denied the Homeowners‟ property interest in future accretions.181
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.182
IV. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
A notable trend in recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions is the increasing delivery of
plurality opinions where the justices join and dissent with one another on a section by section
basis.183 Beach Renourishment is no exception. Indeed, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of a
unanimous Court; however, concurrences by Justices Kennedy and Breyer and joined by others
evidence the Court‟s unanimous judgment was determined by following very different lines of
reasoning.
Beach Renourishment culminated in two separate but related issues. The first issue was
whether the Florida Supreme Court unlawfully took property without compensation when it held
that the Homeowners‟ property rights to future accretions did not exist.184 The second, and more
divisive, was whether a court of law or other member of the judicial branch can “take” property
under the Fifth Amendment‟s takings clause.185
A. The Florida Supreme Court did not unlawfully take property without compensation
when it held that the Homeowners’ property rights to future accretions did not exist.

181

Id. at 2600-2601.
In granting certiorari, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, recognized the Court would not ordinarily consider
an issue that was first presented to a state court in a petition for rehearing unless the state court addressed it.
However, where the state-court decision itself is claimed to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the state court‟s
refusal to hear an issue will not bar the Court‟s power to hear the case. Id. at n. 4.
183
Joseph M. Cacace, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Reexamination of the Marks
Doctrine after Rapanos v. United States, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 97, 98 (2007).
184
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2611.
185
Id. at 2608.
182
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Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began the opinion with the fundamentals of
Florida‟s property law. As a general rule, state law governs property rights, including property
rights in navigable waters and the land that lies beneath them.186 Under Florida law, the state
owns all lands permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore (the land
between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line) in trust for the public.187 The separating
line between private beachfront, or littoral property, and state-owned trust land is the mean highwater line.188 Because of their unique position, littoral property owners have special property
rights in relation to the water and the foreshore.189 These special rights include the right to
access the water, the right use water for specific purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of
the water, and the right to receive accretions and relictions190 to the littoral property.191
Traditionally, for land to qualify as an accretion it must have formed as a result of a gradual
process that is so slow that the result only becomes noticeable after many years.192 When the
change to the land is sudden and immediately apparent, it is classified as an avulsion193 and the
littoral property owner is not entitled to the same property interest as to an accretion.194
Florida law grants the littoral owner title to any dry land added to his property by
accretion.195 Submerged land that rapidly becomes dry however, is not considered accretion and
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Id. at 2597.
Id. at 2598.
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Id. (citing Miller, 141 Fla. at 458-460, 193 So. at 427-428).
189
Id.
190
Unlike accretions which are additions of sand, sediment, or other deposits to water front lands, relictions are
lands that were once covered by water which later become dry when the water receded. Id.
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Id.
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Id.
193
An Avulsion is defined as “the sudden or violent action of the elements causing, for example, a channel of a river
to abandon its old bed for a new one, or the removal of a substantial quantity of earth from the land of one owner
and its subsequent deposit on that of another. The difference between avulsion and reliction or accretion is that
avulsion is perceptible while in progress.” Id. at 2588 (citing Bd. of Trustees of the Internal Imp. Trust Fund v. Sand
Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 946 (Fla. 1987)).
194
Id. at 2598.
195
Id.
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the title to that land remains in the hands of the state.196 Thus, whenever there is an avulsion
separating littoral property and any future accretion land, a private property owner cannot claim
the new accretions as part of his or her property because the accretion is added to the state‟s
avulsion land.197
The Homeowners claimed their property interest in enjoying future accretions added to
their beachfront was unlawfully taken when the FDEP approved the beach restoration project.198
However, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out, there can be no taking of property by the
government unless a party had an interest in that property to begin with.199 The Court
recognized the state of Florida holds the title to all lands submerged underneath the water.200
Furthermore, the Court recognized under Florida law that previously submerged land exposed
suddenly by the process of avulsion belongs to the original owner and not to the littoral owner
whose property is adjacent.201 Any new accretions then become the property of the avulsion
owner: the state of Florida. From this analysis the Court concluded, under the traditional
common law of property, that the Homeowners did not have a property interest in future
accretions so long as their land is separated from the sea by avulsion lands.202
In response to the common law principals, the Homeowners argued the Court should
create an exception to the avulsion rule when the State is the cause of the avulsion.203 Relying
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Id.
Id. at 2599 (emphasis in original).
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Id. at 2611.
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Id. at 2612.
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upon Florida case law, the Court rejected this argument.204 From the Court‟s analysis, Florida
law has long recognized that dry land created by filling submerged land is classified as an
avulsion, and the state retains the title to that property.205 Furthermore, the Court declined to
create an exception to the rule of avulsion under the guise of judicial restraint.206 The Takings
Clause in the Fifth Amendment protects property rights as they were established under law.207
The Court held that it would be improper to declare a taking of property that is not granted to a
private property owner under Florida property law because Florida does not make a distinction
between ownership of avulsions created by nature and avulsions created by government
action.208
B. A Court of Law can execute a taking under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.
The second and more divisive issue was whether a court can be the government actor that
takes property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.209 The Court recognized that
unlike the Habeas Corpus210 or Ex Post Facto211 Clauses in the U.S. Constitution, the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment212 is not addressed to the action of a specific branch of
government.213
The plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia contended that there was no textual
support for the proposition that takings executed by the judicial branch were somehow different
204

Id. (citing Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 574, 112 So. 274, 287 (1927) (holding “when the State drained water
from a lakebed belonging to the State, causing land that was formerly below the mean high-water line to become dry
land, that land continued to belong to the State”)).
205
Id. at 2612.
206
Id. at 2613.
207
Id. at 2612.
208
Id. at 2612-2613.
209
Id. at 2608.
210
U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
211
Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3).
212
Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. V, § 3).
213
Id.
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from takings affected by any other branch of government.214 Additionally, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, stated that it would be an absurdity to allow the judiciary to do by court order
what a legislature could not do by statue.215 The Takings Clause bars the government from
taking private property without just compensation, and the particular state actor doing the taking
is irrelevant for constitutional purposes.216
Although the Court did not develop its own test for determining whether a court has
performed a taking, the majority was quick to list other constitutional tests believed to be
inappropriate for determining the presence of a judicial taking.217 First, the majority dismissed
the “fair and substantial basis” test taken from independent state grounds jurisprudence without
explanation.218 It further dismissed an “unpredictability” test that a judicial taking would
constitute so drastic a change in state law that would be unpredictable for relevant precedents.219
In its dismissal of tests, the majority showed its unease at giving recognition and legitimacy to
any test which is based on notions of “fairness” or “substantive” concepts.220
Both Justice Kennedy‟s and Justice Breyer‟s concurring opinions advocated caution to
the plurality. In his concurrence, Justice Breyer admitted that there could possibly be such a
thing as a judicial taking, but he stated that this question of constitutional law is “better left for

214

Id.
Id. (citing Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211-1212, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 1334 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
216
Id. at 2602 (emphasis in original).
217
Id. at 2607-2608.
218
Id. at 2608 (citing Broad River Power Co. v. S.C. ex rel. Daniel, 28 U.S. 537, 540 (1930) (indicating if a state
court can show that its decision is based entirely on state law, and the decision does not implicate a federal question,
than the U.S. Supreme Court does not have power of review. However, to ensure that state courts do not attempt to
“evade” Supreme Court review, the Court has developed the “fair and substantial basis” test, which examines
whether the state court‟s decision is fairly supported on state law principals)).
219
Id. at 2610.
220
Justice Scalia spent most of his plurality opinion criticizing Justice Kennedy for advocating a test based the
Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause. For a personal testimonial of Justice Scalia‟s unease with notions of
“fairness” in judicial tests see: Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).
215
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another day.”221 Justice Kennedy‟s concurrence took issue with the plurality‟s conclusion that
there is such a thing as a judicial taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.222
Rather, Justice Kennedy stated that if there were such a thing as a judicial taking, it would be
checked by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.223 Justice
Kennedy believed these amendments would have a greater ability to protect private liberty
interests than the Takings Clause.224
V. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS
Beach Renourishment is an interesting case in both its holding and its warring opinions.
The Court held there was not a taking of two homeowners‟ property rights to future accretions
and that Florida‟s property law considered the placement of fill sand an avulsion, allowing
Florida to retain title of the land. The Court further concluded that any accretion that develops
after the placement of fill sand is part of the avulsion owner‟s property and not the littoral
owner‟s property.
However, the refusal of the Court to create an exception to the avulsion rule when the
state is the cause of the avulsion is troubling for several reasons. First, the common law concepts
of accretions, littoral property, and avulsions pertained to naturally occurring phenomena, not
human-caused events. Second, the supporting case law cited by the Court held that littoral
owners did not have a property right to accretions separated from the littoral property by an
avulsion was not as analogous as the Court made it seem. The major Florida case cited by the

221

Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223
Id.
224
Id.
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Court225 concerned property rights where natural bodies of water were drained dry and the
littoral property owner did not have a right to the formerly submerged land. In Beach
Renourishment, however, the dispute was not over a property right to newly accessible land.
Rather, the dispute was over the separation of property that would belong to the Homeowners,
had Florida not created an entirely new piece of property separating the original beachfront from
the ocean.
The issue of whether there is such a thing as a judicial taking is one that currently
receives little regard, but one that will likely create a landmark decision in the near future.
Although the Justices debated fiercely over the existence and logistics of judicial takings, they
reached few concrete conclusions. They did, however, make very clear that they were laying a
foundation for a future decision where the issue of judicial takings will be established or
dismissed as dicta.
VI. CONCLUSION
Beach Renourishment will not change the current landscape of takings litigation, but it is
likely to be the foundation for new takings jurisprudence. Whether the U.S. Constitution (or the
Court) will permit a judicial taking and what judicial standards shall be applied to a judicial
taking case has yet to be seen. Based on Beach Renourishment, it is likely that a landmark
decision regarding the scope and meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment will be
coming sooner than later.

225

Id. at 2611, 2612 (see Martin, 93 Fla. at 574, 112 So. at 287).
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